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ABSTRACT:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“Additive	 ﾠtheories”	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality,	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm,	 ﾠare	 ﾠviews	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpresuppose	 ﾠany	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
add	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrational	 ﾠthought	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“monitor”	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ“regulate”	 ﾠour	 ﾠbelieving-ﾭ‐on-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐basis-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐perception	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠacting-ﾭ‐on-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐basis-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐
desire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
action	 ﾠare	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠrationality,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠ
faces	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠdifficulties,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠstructurally	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Cartesian	 ﾠdualism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
intrinsically	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠreason	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpower	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
intuitively	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUnity	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠhow	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠentitlement	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiderative	 ﾠ
life	 ﾠhe	 ﾠoversees	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“I”	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ“it”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠgive	 ﾠus	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠreject	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠsketch	 ﾠan	 ﾠalternative,	 ﾠ“transformative”	 ﾠframework	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
think	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
Additive	 ﾠTheories	 ﾠof	 ﾠRationality:	 ﾠA	 ﾠCritique	 ﾠ
Matthew	 ﾠBoyle,	 ﾠHarvard	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠhad	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠdrives,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
call	 ﾠreason	 ﾠin	 ﾠhim;	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdrives	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnaturally	 ﾠtear	 ﾠhis	 ﾠforces	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠobscurely	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠfree	 ﾠcircle	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
arise	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhim…	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠhad	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠsenses,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠ reason;	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ precisely	 ﾠ his	 ﾠ senses’	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ susceptibility	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ stimulation,	 ﾠ
precisely	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ representations	 ﾠ mightily	 ﾠ pressing	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ him	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ them,	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠchoke	 ﾠall	 ﾠcold	 ﾠreflectiveness.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ J.	 ﾠG.	 ﾠHerder,	 ﾠTreatise	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOrigin	 ﾠof	 ﾠLanguages,	 ﾠPt.	 ﾠI,	 ﾠ§2	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
1.1	 ﾠ My	 ﾠaim	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠto	 ﾠcriticize	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠwidely-ﾭ‐held	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality,	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ
scrutiny.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠview,	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrough	 ﾠbut	 ﾠevocative	 ﾠway,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“reflect	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠreasons”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠmodule	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠminds	 ﾠpossess,	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaccumulating	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdesire-ﾭ‐
governed	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠalready	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminds	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠ
additional	 ﾠRationality	 ﾠModule,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠheld,	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠmonitor	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulate	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
believing-ﾭ‐on-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐basis-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐perception	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠacting-ﾭ‐on-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐basis-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐desire	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
nonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcannot;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmake	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠ
essentially	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠ
perceive	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠany	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠperceives	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesires;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠdifferentiates	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠand	 ﾠadditional.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcall	 ﾠviews	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshape	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
label	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠmark	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠviews:	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
presuppose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠadd	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“monitoring”	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ“regulating”	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief-ﾭ‐on-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐basis-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐perception	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction-ﾭ‐on-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐basis-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐desire	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠcan	 ﾠperform.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
rationality	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“tacked	 ﾠon”	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalready	 ﾠforms	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
intelligible	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠaddition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ These	 ﾠcharacterizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠof	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠneed	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠclarification,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠshall	 ﾠshortly	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthem	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprecise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠthough,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠhelpful	 ﾠto	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠsome	 ﾠquotations	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠillustrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠview	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsider,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠpair	 ﾠof	 ﾠremarks,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠGareth	 ﾠEvans	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠVelleman:	 ﾠ
[W]e	 ﾠarrive	 ﾠat	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠinput	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠto	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠdispositions…—perhaps	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
phylogenetically	 ﾠmore	 ﾠancient	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrain—but	 ﾠalso	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinput	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠa	 ﾠthinking,	 ﾠconcept-ﾭ‐applying,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠsystem;	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠ
thoughts,	 ﾠplans,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeliberations	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
informational	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinput…	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
epiphenomena;	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠcritically	 ﾠupon	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
thoughts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlinks	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠand	 ﾠconcept-ﾭ‐
applying	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehavior,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother…	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurther,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
intelligibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠthere	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
harmony	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠgives	 ﾠrise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Evans	 ﾠ1982,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ158-ﾭ‐159)	 ﾠ
Suppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcharged	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtask	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesigning	 ﾠan	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠ
agent,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmere	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠmotivation…	 ﾠ	 ﾠ[You	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot]	 ﾠ
start	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠscratch.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwould	 ﾠadd	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠ
design	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmotivated	 ﾠcreatures,	 ﾠand	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwould	 ﾠadd	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
mechanism	 ﾠmodifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmotivational	 ﾠforces	 ﾠalready	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork…	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠ
endowed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠforces	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠhim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠalready	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠby	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
nonautonomous	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠnonautonomous	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHis	 ﾠ
practical	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsprings	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠintervening	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Velleman	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ11-ﾭ‐12)1	 ﾠ
Both	 ﾠEvans	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage,	 ﾠas	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
creatures,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠaround	 ﾠus	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠEvans,	 ﾠour	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
perception;	 ﾠfor	 ﾠVelleman,	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠour	 ﾠaims	 ﾠin	 ﾠaction)	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠof	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
constituted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(1)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ a	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprimordial	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠa	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠadjusts	 ﾠour	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠdispositions	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠto	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠinputs;	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmotivational	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠtranslates	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthings	 ﾠinto	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpursuit	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthem);	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(2)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ“reasoning	 ﾠsystem”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ“monitors”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprimordial	 ﾠ
system,	 ﾠ“assesses”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠactivities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“regulates”	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠassessments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ As	 ﾠboth	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠnote,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠcoexist;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
normally	 ﾠexhibit	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠharmony:	 ﾠstates	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimordial	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠmust	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠknown	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠis	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer;	 ﾠand	 ﾠassessments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠmust	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
produce	 ﾠpredictable	 ﾠmodifications	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimordial	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠreasoned	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreact	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠpursue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠof	 ﾠharmony	 ﾠ
implies	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠare	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠnormally,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠconstituting	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
special	 ﾠterm,	 ﾠas	 ﾠEvans	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“conscious	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexperience”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
condition	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠinput	 ﾠis	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠseamlessly	 ﾠgoverns	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠdispositions	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠthought.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠcoined	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠterm,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠonly	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlet	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmislead	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠviews	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠperception,	 ﾠor	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
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1	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠintroduces	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠhypothetical	 ﾠmode,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsubsequently	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠreason	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadded	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠfaculty	 ﾠof	 ﾠmotivation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
proposal	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwe	 ﾠactually	 ﾠpossess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
difference,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠdifference:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠ
perceives	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠperception	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
harmoniously	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠ“thinking,	 ﾠconcept-ﾭ‐applying,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
reasoning	 ﾠsystem”;	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠa	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠharmoniously	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠ
faculty	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“practical	 ﾠreason,”	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠmodifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmotivational	 ﾠforces	 ﾠ
already	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork.”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.2	 ﾠ Evans	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
uncommon	 ﾠexplicitness,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠis	 ﾠwidespread.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinevitable	 ﾠonce	 ﾠwe	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
beings	 ﾠare	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
consensus	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠuniversal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDissent	 ﾠis	 ﾠvoiced,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠby	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠMcDowell:	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠperception	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmere	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNow	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠtemptation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠisolate	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthem	 ﾠby	 ﾠstripping	 ﾠoff	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠus,	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠarrive	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠresidue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠfigures	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠlives	 ﾠof	 ﾠmere	 ﾠanimals…	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcompulsory	 ﾠto	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
accommodate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠstriking	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfactorizing	 ﾠway:	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠlives	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
core	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠlife	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmere	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
extra	 ﾠingredient	 ﾠin	 ﾠaddition…	 ﾠ	 ﾠInstead	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmere	 ﾠ
animals	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠto	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠenvironment,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠform.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(McDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ64)	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠproposes,	 ﾠour	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceiving:	 ﾠit	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“special	 ﾠform”	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
environment,	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠare	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠby	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠweigh	 ﾠ
reasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠour	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
accounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠstyle.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠif	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ“perception”	 ﾠsignifies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
creatures	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexplained	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
perceiving	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexplained	 ﾠas:	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠsupplemented	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
monitor	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulate	 ﾠthis	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasoning.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
perceiving	 ﾠmust	 ﾠitself	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrational	 ﾠthought	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠof	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠperception	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“conceptual”:	 ﾠit	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠepisodes	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠundergo	 ﾠmust	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimply	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠreason	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimport	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠepisodes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature	 ﾠ
according	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠactualizations	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature,	 ﾠit	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠdiffers	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacity.2	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠrecommends	 ﾠa	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠ
theories	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiderative	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtransformed	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠrational	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠand	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠ
fundamentally	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠcounterparts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠstake	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠMcDowellian	 ﾠview	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠperception.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠhis	 ﾠMind	 ﾠand	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠ(1994),	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimality	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“permeated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
rationality”	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠsummed	 ﾠup	 ﾠhis	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠslogans:	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ“conceptual	 ﾠcontent”,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠ“actualizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities”.3	 ﾠ	 ﾠMost	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠview	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠslogan,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠon	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
views	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠthen	 ﾠheld	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshape	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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2	 ﾠThe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠhere	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividuate	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlong	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠ
extending	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠ(cf.	 ﾠDe	 ﾠAnima	 ﾠII.	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠ415a18-ﾭ‐20).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠgrounded,	 ﾠpresumably,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠ
idea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠenable	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠThomas	 ﾠAquinas:	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠis	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWherefore	 ﾠwe	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdirected,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsequently	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
diversified	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠis	 ﾠdiversified.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Summa	 ﾠTheologica,	 ﾠIa,	 ﾠq.77,	 ﾠa.3,	 ﾠcorpus)	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividuation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠpaper.	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“conceptual	 ﾠcontent”	 ﾠslogan,	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠLecture	 ﾠI,	 ﾠ§4.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“conceptual	 ﾠcapacities”	 ﾠ
slogan,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠLecture	 ﾠI,	 ﾠ§5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
propositional	 ﾠstructures,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠa	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠputs	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠknow	 ﾠnoninferentially	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
experience,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecificity	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠby	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“demonstrative	 ﾠconcept,”	 ﾠetc.4	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsubsequently	 ﾠchanged	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmind	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpoints,5	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalways	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠparts	 ﾠto	 ﾠhis	 ﾠposition:	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorder	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠmust	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠ(namely,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠan	 ﾠadd-ﾭ‐on	 ﾠshape),	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠviews	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
former	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalways	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠview,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠ
responses	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠconfronted	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠpresumably,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseemed	 ﾠclear	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠstake	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠby	 ﾠitself:	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ
theses	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠto	 ﾠflesh	 ﾠit	 ﾠout,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠit	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠperception	 ﾠ“actualizes	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities”?	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠform,	 ﾠsince,	 ﾠif	 ﾠcorrect,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠa	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠheld	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
tempting	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠmentality	 ﾠmust	 ﾠexhibit.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠadmit,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠdeny,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminds	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommon.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠobserves,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
real	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠis	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“something	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommon.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdditive	 ﾠ
theorists	 ﾠadvocate	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
nonrational	 ﾠanimals:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinguishable	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠin	 ﾠrational	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsame	 ﾠkind	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwholly	 ﾠconstitutes	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTransformative	 ﾠtheorists,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠ
locate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠmentality	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
explanatory	 ﾠstructure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠmentality	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠmentality	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠmentality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ“have	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommon,”	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
view,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠseparable	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠStalnaker	 ﾠ1998,	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠ1998	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠHeck	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠKelly	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠByrne	 ﾠ2005.	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠSee	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠways	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
share	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠand	 ﾠconative	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshare	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠconative	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠof	 ﾠpower	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠadmits	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠrealization.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠ







	 ﾠ It	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠemphasize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive/transformative	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
distinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠviews	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiderative	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
animals	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠin,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠviews	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdevelop.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠborn	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“actualizes	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠ
emerges	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Young	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠthings	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠthese	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠ
capacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
“intrinsically”	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrational	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠ
related	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWould	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvindicate	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠvindication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠof	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠactualize	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠ
capacities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠmature	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprimitive	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠmature	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject,	 ﾠone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudge,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaccounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠway:	 ﾠas	 ﾠconsisting	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠperception	 ﾠharmoniously	 ﾠ
integrated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠ“thinking,	 ﾠconcept-ﾭ‐applying,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ
Additive	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠ
(Nonrational)	 ﾠAnimal	 ﾠ
(further	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠ	 ﾠ







in	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠ
ways)	 ﾠ
Nonrational	 ﾠAnimal	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠRational	 ﾠAnimal	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
system.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf,	 ﾠas	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠmaintains,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmature	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
actualized,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠitself	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
actualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmature	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠher	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
capacities	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠactualizations	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
explain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmature	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠreference	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthese	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcapacities.6	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsucceed,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
additive	 ﾠtheorist’s	 ﾠproject	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠlies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopmental	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠmature	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠin.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.3	 ﾠ It	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠold	 ﾠidea	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠmindedness	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠframework	 ﾠdepicted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright-ﾭ‐hand	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠfamously	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“rational”	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdifferentiates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠ“animal,”	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠcharacterizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠof	 ﾠgenera	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfall	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠI	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠthing	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠpredicated	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
differentiated	 ﾠin	 ﾠno	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠaccidental	 ﾠway…	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠmust	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠattach	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠmust	 ﾠboth	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanimals,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠvery	 ﾠanimality	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach…	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠI	 ﾠgive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠname	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
‘difference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus’	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠotherness	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠitself	 ﾠother.7	 ﾠ
Commenting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpassage,	 ﾠThomas	 ﾠAquinas	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPhilosopher	 ﾠsays	 ﾠhere	 ﾠrules	 ﾠout	 ﾠ…	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
whatever	 ﾠpertains	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠspecies,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠman	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠhow	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠopponents	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠin	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠ
McDowell	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠhe	 ﾠopposes	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠdevelops	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
pre-ﾭ‐rational	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactualizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠmature	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠ“actualize	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthus	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠ(1998,	 ﾠ2001)	 ﾠand	 ﾠHeck	 ﾠ(2000),	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
McDowell’s	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠopponents,	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠmature	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
availability	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠAristotle,	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ(1057b39-ﾭ‐1058a7).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠhorse.8	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠ
mentality	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlong	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠfairly	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠeclipse.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠso	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠand	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthough	 ﾠa	 ﾠbattery	 ﾠof	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
objections	 ﾠare	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠprofess	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠview.9	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
objections	 ﾠare,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠme,	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠput	 ﾠforward	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠappreciation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
transformative	 ﾠview	 ﾠworks,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠresources	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdefending	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠ
difficulty	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠso	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠdefinite	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠframework	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfallen	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠuse.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠstep	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠframework	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
skepticism	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
develop	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠgrounds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories,	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠAquinas,	 ﾠCommentary	 ﾠon	 ﾠAristotle’s	 ﾠMetaphysics,	 ﾠVol.	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠBk.	 ﾠX,	 ﾠCh.	 ﾠ10,	 ﾠ§2119,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ760.	 ﾠ	 ﾠElsewhere,	 ﾠ
speaking	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠAristotle,	 ﾠAquinas	 ﾠconsiders	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠobjection:	 ﾠ
[A]	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠhorse	 ﾠare	 ﾠalike	 ﾠin	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNow	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠis	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠsoul;	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠhorse	 ﾠare	 ﾠalike	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
sensitive	 ﾠsouls.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠhorse	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrational.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsequently	 ﾠneither	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing.	 ﾠ
Aquinas	 ﾠreplies:	 ﾠ
Just	 ﾠas	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠas	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠis	 ﾠneither	 ﾠrational	 ﾠnor	 ﾠnonrational,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ‘rational	 ﾠ
animal’	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠ‘nonrational	 ﾠanimal’	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrute;	 ﾠso	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠ
soul	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠas	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠis	 ﾠneither	 ﾠrational	 ﾠnor	 ﾠnonrational;	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠis	 ﾠrational,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠin	 ﾠbrutes	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnonrational.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Quaestiones	 ﾠde	 ﾠAnima,	 ﾠq.	 ﾠ
11,	 ﾠad	 ﾠ19)	 ﾠ
Several	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠI	 ﾠraise	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠare	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠon	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠAquinas	 ﾠ
raises	 ﾠfor	 ﾠviews	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠ“soul”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠintrinsically	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠ“soul”	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠAquinas	 ﾠassociates	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreading	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Aristotle	 ﾠdefended	 ﾠby	 ﾠAverroes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠAquinas’s	 ﾠcriticisms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠSumma	 ﾠ
Theologica,	 ﾠIa,	 ﾠq.	 ﾠ76,	 ﾠaa.	 ﾠ3-ﾭ‐4,	 ﾠand	 ﾠQuaestiones	 ﾠde	 ﾠAnima,	 ﾠq.	 ﾠ11.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠStandard	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠinclude:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠtension	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ“rational	 ﾠanimals”	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
evolved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrational;	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠforces	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠ
genuinely	 ﾠperceive,	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠand	 ﾠexhibit	 ﾠintelligent	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠpursuit	 ﾠof	 ﾠgoals;	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
deny	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠjudge,	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠand	 ﾠintend	 ﾠirrationality;	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠ
difficulties	 ﾠin	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠinfants,	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccounting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠinto	 ﾠmature	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures;	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠvaguer	 ﾠway	 ﾠ“unscientific”	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠ
“naturalistic”	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠrest	 ﾠeither	 ﾠon	 ﾠmisrepresentations	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheorist’s	 ﾠposition	 ﾠor	 ﾠon	 ﾠdisputable	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshape	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠsound	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠworld	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠmy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠ
theories,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠto	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
them,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ“Essentially	 ﾠRational	 ﾠAnimals”,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompanion	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
positive	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframework	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdeveloped.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
call	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnity	 ﾠProblem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠVersions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
raised	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠdomains,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠgenerality	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠappreciated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthis	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠclass	 ﾠof	 ﾠviews,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠwherever	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠare	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠwill	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout,	 ﾠinterestingly	 ﾠenough,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Cartesian	 ﾠdualism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccident:	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviews	 ﾠabout	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
explanation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmotivate	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠare	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmotivate	 ﾠ
mind-ﾭ‐body	 ﾠdualism,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠbear	 ﾠa	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠto	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠ
views	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠhorse-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐rider	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠone	 ﾠpower	 ﾠis	 ﾠset	 ﾠover	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠ
mind	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠof	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist’s	 ﾠposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmetaphysically	 ﾠ
extravagant	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠposition	 ﾠis:	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠregard	 ﾠour	 ﾠrational	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
inhering	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠimmaterial	 ﾠsubstance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpositions	 ﾠface	 ﾠ
similar	 ﾠdifficulties,	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠa	 ﾠformal	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠ
2.1	 ﾠ	 ﾠ The	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interaction	 ﾠthey	 ﾠposit	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiring,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
judging	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoosing,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdifficulty,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠreconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠraised	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠperception	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
nonconceptual.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ When	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠargued	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠ“given”	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
play	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠplay:	 ﾠ
[W]e	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠreally	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
warranted	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠas	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspace	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcepts:	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
implication	 ﾠor	 ﾠprobabilification,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhold	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠexercises	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
conceptual	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠextend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustificatory	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
relations	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(McDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ7)	 ﾠ
Any	 ﾠsatisfactory	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠheld,	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠhow	 ﾠour	 ﾠperception	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
exercise	 ﾠan	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠ“constraint”	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠjudge,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠof	 ﾠforming	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reasonable	 ﾠview	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠinput,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“frictionless	 ﾠspinning	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠvoid”	 ﾠ(McDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ11).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠclaimed,	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠby	 ﾠsupposing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠsupplies	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠ
content	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠour	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠin	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠmust	 ﾠagree,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
limitation	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠunintelligible	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠ
constraint.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠany	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠjudging;	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠis	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠshe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠsee	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthus-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐so,	 ﾠif	 ﾠshe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ“Why	 ﾠshould	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat?”	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrules	 ﾠout	 ﾠits	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ McDowell’s	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠclaiming	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstates	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠturned	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠthought	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠthought	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontent,	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠheld,	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ“spontaneity”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
knowing	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠa	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠhas	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠits	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠinto	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠ…	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
genuinely	 ﾠelements	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠfaculty	 ﾠof	 ﾠspontaneity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexercised	 ﾠin	 ﾠjudgments,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
rationally	 ﾠlinked	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠand	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpossessor	 ﾠengages	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠadjusting	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
thinking	 ﾠto	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(McDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ46-ﾭ‐47)10	 ﾠ
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10	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠremarking	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
conceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠBill	 ﾠBrewer’s	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠ
defense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠstates	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontent,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdefines	 ﾠa	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠstate	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnonconceptual,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
obtaining	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠengage	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠreflection.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠargued,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠstood	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
determination:	 ﾠ
[T]he	 ﾠputatively	 ﾠrational	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠexperiences,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠposition	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠas	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠof	 ﾠspontaneity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgments,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
conceive	 ﾠas	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠof	 ﾠspontaneity,	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠspontaneity—liable	 ﾠto	 ﾠrevision,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐scrutiny	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
active	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠrecommends.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠ
recognize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠas	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠreason-ﾭ‐constituting.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(McDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠ
p.	 ﾠ52).	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠmight	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsense	 ﾠ“match”	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠcontent,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠher	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
itself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠher	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠso	 ﾠjudging.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠbest,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠP	 ﾠmight	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcame	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠjudged	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠsummed	 ﾠthis	 ﾠup	 ﾠby	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠ“exculpations,”	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ“justifications,”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠjudgments:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠbest	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠexplicable,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠexcusable,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠjudged	 ﾠas	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdid;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
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mental	 ﾠstate	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠjust	 ﾠif	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresentational	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠcharacterizable	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠmust	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠenables	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
premise	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeductive	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠinference	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
(e.g.	 ﾠinductive	 ﾠor	 ﾠabductive).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Brewer	 ﾠ1999,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ149).	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠcommittal	 ﾠthan	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrespects,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcommittal	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
others.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠcommittal	 ﾠ–	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠapparently	 ﾠ–	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
mental	 ﾠstate	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ
actualizes	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
content	 ﾠappeals	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠitself	 ﾠactualizes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠneither	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠimplied	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠserve	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpremise	 ﾠor	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠinference	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠnot	 ﾠif	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ
means,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBrewer,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠin	 ﾠform).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠ
equivalent	 ﾠin	 ﾠBrewer’s	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMcDowellian	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠmust	 ﾠitself	 ﾠactualize	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtoken,	 ﾠBrewer’s	 ﾠposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcommittal	 ﾠthan	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠ
inasmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠbuilds	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdeterminate	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcharacterized.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠdid,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠmake	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
this,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠright,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠshe	 ﾠsaw	 ﾠfor	 ﾠso	 ﾠjudging.11	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ McDowell	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠevocative	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠ
metaphorical	 ﾠidiom,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠhis	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
natural	 ﾠobjection,	 ﾠraised	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthors,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠtrades	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
sequitur.12	 ﾠ	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
spontaneity”	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠevaluate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobative	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
reason,	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠevaluation	 ﾠmust	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠon	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
obviously	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmere	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperception	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
evaluated	 ﾠmust	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠon	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠcouldn’t	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠme	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠrepresentations	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠintrinsically	 ﾠconceptual,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
possession	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠthought	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠenabled	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
articulate	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠweigh?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ We	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠonce	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠclearer	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnonconceptualism	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
perception.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠargument	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠ(§2.4),	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ
drawing	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcomparisons	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
McDowell’s	 ﾠargument	 ﾠraises.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoment,	 ﾠlet	 ﾠme	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠmake	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsketch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠjust	 ﾠgiven.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ First,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“Conceptual	 ﾠcontent”	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠfigures	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠterm	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
attribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠenable	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthings	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthus-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐so	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠform	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter.13	 ﾠ	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠambition	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠSee	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠLecture	 ﾠI,	 ﾠ§3,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠLecture	 ﾠIII	 ﾠand	 ﾠAfterword,	 ﾠPart	 ﾠII.	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠHeck	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ512-ﾭ‐514	 ﾠand	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ255-ﾭ‐256.	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcapacity-ﾭ‐oriented	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresentational	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
universal	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠa	 ﾠrejection	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing	 ﾠissues	 ﾠabout	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontent,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠStalnaker	 ﾠ
1998	 ﾠand	 ﾠByrne	 ﾠ2005)	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠground	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
primarily	 ﾠengaged:	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠEvans’s	 ﾠ“Generality	 ﾠConstraint”	 ﾠon	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠ(Evans	 ﾠ1982,	 ﾠ
pp.	 ﾠ100-ﾭ‐105)	 ﾠand	 ﾠPeacocke’s	 ﾠ“Principle	 ﾠof	 ﾠDependence”	 ﾠ(Peacocke	 ﾠ1992,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ5,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcf.	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ42-ﾭ‐51).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ None	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠis	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠabout	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠan	 ﾠattribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
conceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠcommits	 ﾠus	 ﾠto,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠis	 ﾠ…F…	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpredicate	 ﾠF,	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠelse	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
difficulty	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
perception	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠstill	 ﾠmaintains	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠgive	 ﾠus	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
words,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠambition	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtreats	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠrational	 ﾠperceiver	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠway:	 ﾠas	 ﾠconsisting	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnot-ﾭ‐intrinsically-ﾭ‐rationality-ﾭ‐
involving	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceive,	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠare	 ﾠinputs	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
independent	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠjudgments.14	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Secondly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠif	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
perceiving	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠon	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceptions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
judgments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠof	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠphrasing	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠforeground	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠexplanation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠasks	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ“relations	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠwarranted”	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“implication	 ﾠand	 ﾠprobabilification”	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhold	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠreader	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠtext	 ﾠwill	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠperception	 ﾠshould	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠR	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠJ	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠquite	 ﾠunaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠR,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠin	 ﾠno	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠin	 ﾠjudging.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHis	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠshould	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
intelligible	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠher	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
include):	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontent,	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoccurrence	 ﾠof	 ﾠF	 ﾠin	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ
just	 ﾠin	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthings	 ﾠas	 ﾠF,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthings	 ﾠas	 ﾠF	 ﾠis	 ﾠdefined,	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
stipulation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠenables	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠmake	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
something’s	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠF.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠF,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠif	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
capacities	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠon	 ﾠin	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Note	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠany	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
reflective	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠpossible.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠpresupposing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠin	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠand	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
principal	 ﾠnonconceptualist	 ﾠopponents	 ﾠtake	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠsupplying	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcontents,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠdecade	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidea	 ﾠ(see,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠTravis	 ﾠ
2004,	 ﾠBrewer	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠsimplicity,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠadhered	 ﾠhere	 ﾠto	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactualizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthis	 ﾠassumption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBriefly:	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠworldly	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrepresentational	 ﾠ
contents	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthose	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresentation	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠperception	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
former	 ﾠway	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠverb	 ﾠcharacterizing	 ﾠour	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠnoun	 ﾠ
characterizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠrepresentational	 ﾠcontent)	 ﾠ–	 ﾠstill	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpresentation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠwork	 ﾠnow	 ﾠin	 ﾠprogress,	 ﾠI	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
fuller	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠperception	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtake	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
board	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinsights	 ﾠof	 ﾠcritics	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcontent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠher	 ﾠso	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠto	 ﾠrationalize	 ﾠ
it.15	 ﾠ	 ﾠHis	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ“actualize	 ﾠ
conceptual	 ﾠcapacities”	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠgive	 ﾠan	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠdependence	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclosest	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcome	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠas	 ﾠinteracting	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ–	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠeven	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwould	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠa	 ﾠdependence	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠkind.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.2	 ﾠ To	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠraises	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠ
nonconceptualism,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠvenerable	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠ
dualism,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠever	 ﾠsince	 ﾠPrincess	 ﾠElisabeth	 ﾠof	 ﾠBohemia	 ﾠwrote	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Descartes	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠdetermination	 ﾠof	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpropulsion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠthing	 ﾠmoved,	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpropelled	 ﾠby	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠ
it,	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquality	 ﾠand	 ﾠshape	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurface	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlatter…	 ﾠ[Yet]	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
yourself	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠexclude	 ﾠextension	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
touching	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠincompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠimmaterial	 ﾠthing.16	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠhere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠstated	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠmechanistic	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
physical	 ﾠcausation	 ﾠpresupposed	 ﾠin	 ﾠElisabeth’s	 ﾠremark.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠview	 ﾠposits	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrelata	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠnatures	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
exclude	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠrelation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDescartes,	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠdeterminations	 ﾠare	 ﾠthoughts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠbody	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠextended	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdeterminations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
thought	 ﾠcan	 ﾠnever	 ﾠpertain,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠonly	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpulsion	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠbodies.17	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Every	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbody	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
interaction	 ﾠwith	 ﾠanother	 ﾠbody;	 ﾠany	 ﾠthought	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠonly	 ﾠon	 ﾠother	 ﾠthoughts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠ
Descartes	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthings	 ﾠmight	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠbodies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthings	 ﾠmight	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠno	 ﾠwere	 ﾠminds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠOn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠin	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠAfterword,	 ﾠPart	 ﾠII.	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠElisabeth	 ﾠto	 ﾠDescartes,	 ﾠLa	 ﾠHaye,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1643.	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠCf.	 ﾠMeditations	 ﾠon	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠPhilosophy,	 ﾠAT	 ﾠVII,	 ﾠ26-ﾭ‐27;	 ﾠ78.	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠrealm,	 ﾠin	 ﾠshort,	 ﾠforms	 ﾠa	 ﾠclosed	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠphenomena	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
characterized	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoccurrence	 ﾠis	 ﾠintrinsically	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠof	 ﾠphenomena	 ﾠ
belonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠrealm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠYet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠshould	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠdetermination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnecessitate	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
determination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreality	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠmake	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdeterminations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
determinations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠequally	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthough	 ﾠElisabeth	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmention	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ–	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreality	 ﾠof	 ﾠsense-ﾭ‐perception,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠmake	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
explanatory	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdeterminations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbodily	 ﾠsense-ﾭ‐organs	 ﾠand	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠ
occurring	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠleave	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠframework.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠrealms	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcan	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother?	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠphilosopher	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthis	 ﾠframework	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠleft	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠarray	 ﾠof	 ﾠunattractive	 ﾠoptions:	 ﾠoccasionalism,	 ﾠpreestablished	 ﾠ
harmony,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠidealism?18	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠnonconceptualism	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠways	 ﾠ
similar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobjection.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠis	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠobscured	 ﾠby	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠconcessive	 ﾠmove	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
allowing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠmight	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠ“exculpations”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
judgments:	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠsound	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠhis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhow	 ﾠstates	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠ
contents	 ﾠcould	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠjudgments,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
influence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠconcedes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ“exculpatory	 ﾠconstraint”	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsake	 ﾠof	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠultimate	 ﾠaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcanonical	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠof	 ﾠanother	 ﾠsort.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
holds,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠshe	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠspontaneous	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination:	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
accepting	 ﾠP	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠbecause,	 ﾠon	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠreflectively	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠMy	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠDescartes,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
generically	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠview	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠnaturally	 ﾠgives	 ﾠrise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠilluminating	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠDescartes’s	 ﾠactual	 ﾠreply	 ﾠto	 ﾠElisabeth,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠresources	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠanswering	 ﾠher	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠGarber	 ﾠ2001.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
consideration	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue.19	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ
aims	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠcould	 ﾠconstrain	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determined	 ﾠcharacter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠresemblance	 ﾠto	 ﾠElisabeth’s	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbe	 ﾠapparent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
difficulty	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplainly	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠshaping	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠbodily	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠby	 ﾠwill	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstraining	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠby	 ﾠperception	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠother)	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠcompromising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitutive	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠinfluenced.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Moreover,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠhas	 ﾠan	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠsource	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcase:	 ﾠit	 ﾠarises,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmust	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ(will	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠperception	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠother)	 ﾠis	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠefficacy	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcanonical,	 ﾠ
constitutive	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠinfluenced.	 ﾠ	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthis	 ﾠset-ﾭ‐up,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠis	 ﾠeven	 ﾠpossible.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠgranting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsake	 ﾠof	 ﾠargument	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
possible,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanything	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisruptive	 ﾠone:	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠin	 ﾠbodies	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaccord	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠof	 ﾠnature,	 ﾠor	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
“exculpation”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determined	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠgrounds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠwanted	 ﾠto	 ﾠdescribe:	 ﾠour	 ﾠaim	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠinternally	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ When	 ﾠI	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
difficulty	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠwill	 ﾠarise	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠposits	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠstructure:	 ﾠ
(Canonical	 ﾠExplanation)	 ﾠ For	 ﾠany	 ﾠfact	 ﾠF	 ﾠof	 ﾠtype	 ﾠT1,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcanonical	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠF	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
appeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠF	 ﾠin	 ﾠway	 ﾠW.	 ﾠ
(Non-ﾭ‐disruptive	 ﾠInfluence)	 ﾠ Facts	 ﾠof	 ﾠtype	 ﾠT2	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcanonically	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠtype	 ﾠT1.	 ﾠ
(System	 ﾠExternality)	 ﾠ Facts	 ﾠof	 ﾠtype	 ﾠT2	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠto	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠtype	 ﾠT1	 ﾠin	 ﾠway	 ﾠW.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthree	 ﾠtheses	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠincoherent	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence:	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠbias	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠrationalize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhold	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic,	 ﾠcapacity-ﾭ‐defining	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠexplained	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠrecognizing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠif	 ﾠperception	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠhim	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠour	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcanonical	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ
position.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠis	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
rationality	 ﾠcharacteristically	 ﾠproduce:	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
disruptively	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠpower	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠare	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠonly	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠby	 ﾠdisrupting	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠnondisruptive	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
desire	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠrational	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet	 ﾠ–	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
represent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠpower	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
conditions	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcanonical	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠpower.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠbring	 ﾠthis	 ﾠout,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ(§2.3),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
McDowell	 ﾠfocused:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠ(§2.4).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
2.3	 ﾠ Having	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
mind-ﾭ‐body	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
judgment,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠregister	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdifferences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhereas	 ﾠDescartes	 ﾠ
held	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠbody	 ﾠare	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠsubstances,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcould	 ﾠexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠindependence	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnonconceptualist	 ﾠabout	 ﾠperception	 ﾠposits	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠsubstances	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
distinct	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠto	 ﾠassert	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependence	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠdirection:	 ﾠ
he	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠinto	 ﾠour	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠare	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
engage	 ﾠwith	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment.20	 ﾠ	 ﾠBefore	 ﾠreturning	 ﾠto	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠargument	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠnonconceptualism,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠanother	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠposition	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠbears	 ﾠa	 ﾠstill	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠresemblance	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠcriticizes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpurpose,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
turn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠfaculty	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreasoned	 ﾠ
choice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhere	 ﾠtoo,	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠgive	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠhow	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
20	 ﾠAn	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwell	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠa	 ﾠdependence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconverse	 ﾠdirection:	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
explaining	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠreason	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
desire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠsay	 ﾠmore	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdualistic	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠand	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠin	 ﾠ§3.2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
work,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea,	 ﾠendorsed	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠauthors,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
special	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠagent	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“step	 ﾠback”	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
desires-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐act.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠidea	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠan	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠvivid	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠby	 ﾠChristine	 ﾠ
Korsgaard:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠlower	 ﾠanimal’s	 ﾠattention	 ﾠis	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIts	 ﾠperceptions	 ﾠare	 ﾠits	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠits	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠare	 ﾠits	 ﾠwill.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠactivities,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
conscious	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem…	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠturn	 ﾠour	 ﾠattention	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
perceptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠmental	 ﾠactivities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthink	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthem…	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
find	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠimpulse	 ﾠto	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠI	 ﾠback	 ﾠup	 ﾠand	 ﾠbring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
impulse	 ﾠinto	 ﾠview	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠdistance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpulse	 ﾠ
doesn’t	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠme	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠShall	 ﾠI	 ﾠact?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIs	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ
really	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠact?	 ﾠ(Korsgaard	 ﾠ1996,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ92-ﾭ‐3)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmetaphor	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“backing	 ﾠup”	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠadmits	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
interpretations;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠon	 ﾠone	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠreading,	 ﾠit	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠstructure:	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠis	 ﾠadded,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreature,	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimpelled	 ﾠby	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠalter	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠallows	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠassessments	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠinterventions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠdesiderative	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ“impulses”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
thwarting	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠshould	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠKorsgaard	 ﾠherself	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠ
pains	 ﾠto	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠher	 ﾠview	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠone).21	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccuse	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠauthor	 ﾠof	 ﾠholding	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠview:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstep	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠKorsgaard’s	 ﾠ
metaphor	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠis,	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠan	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠand	 ﾠtempting	 ﾠone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“brute	 ﾠimpulses,”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreason	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
21	 ﾠAn	 ﾠauthor	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠa	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠI	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠis	 ﾠTamar	 ﾠSchapiro	 ﾠ(2009),	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
advocates	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠshe	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠ“inclination	 ﾠas	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠaction”:	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠ“inclinations”	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠnature	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠimpulses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠgovern	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
nonrational	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
scrutinize	 ﾠand	 ﾠgovern	 ﾠthese	 ﾠimpulses,	 ﾠembodies	 ﾠa	 ﾠvenerable	 ﾠand	 ﾠappealing	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
motivation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠappealing	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpicture,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
unacceptable	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠliteral	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠ
literally,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠmysterious	 ﾠhow	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠcan	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠagent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠprima	 ﾠ
facie	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ As	 ﾠKorsgaard’s	 ﾠremark	 ﾠbrings	 ﾠout,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
attractive	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determined	 ﾠact	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠattractive	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
conceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠJust	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠadequacy	 ﾠshe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠscrutinize	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
freely	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠor	 ﾠreject,	 ﾠso	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
adopt	 ﾠaims	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠsufficiency	 ﾠshe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlikewise	 ﾠfreely	 ﾠscrutinize	 ﾠand	 ﾠassess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
gives	 ﾠus	 ﾠa	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(Canonical	 ﾠExplanationD)	 ﾠ For	 ﾠany	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠC	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠS,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcanonical	 ﾠ
explanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠC	 ﾠmust	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠgrasped	 ﾠby	 ﾠS	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
regarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠfor	 ﾠC.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠcan	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
reasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠKorsgaard’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠphrasing	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠthis	 ﾠassumption:	 ﾠin	 ﾠspeaking	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠreflectively	 ﾠ
asking	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ“is	 ﾠreally	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠact,”	 ﾠshe	 ﾠimplicitly	 ﾠpresupposes	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠcan	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠme	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcanonically	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠchoice,	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠall	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠactually	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠme	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
committed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
(Non-ﾭ‐disruptive	 ﾠInfluenceD)	 ﾠ The	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠS	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠX	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcanonically	 ﾠ
explain	 ﾠS’s	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Now,	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠfaculty	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
intrinsically	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfaculty	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠone	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
subject’s	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠengage	 ﾠher	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠX	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠaim	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠput	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠin	 ﾠquasi-ﾭ‐McDowellian	 ﾠlanguage:	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
hold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠactualize	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠdid	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠher	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠX	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠaim	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠher	 ﾠfaculty	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠfaculty	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
animal	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠframe	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpossess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
explain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠreason	 ﾠas	 ﾠconsisting	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ
supplemented	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠmonitor	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulate	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdesires.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Additive	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠare	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠprohibited	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠproject	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
conceiving	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesiderative	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠas	 ﾠitself	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprima	 ﾠ
facie	 ﾠrational	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠaims	 ﾠand	 ﾠobjects,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠactualized	 ﾠin	 ﾠpresentations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠas	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠchoiceworthy	 ﾠor	 ﾠworth	 ﾠpursuing.22	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
objects	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠas	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
instance	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠfaculty	 ﾠof	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠ
puts	 ﾠit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠmodifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmotivational	 ﾠforces	 ﾠalready	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠforces	 ﾠare	 ﾠ“already	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork”	 ﾠexpresses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠ
theorist:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“forces”	 ﾠmonitored	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠdesires,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinguishable	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmotivation	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠa	 ﾠnature	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“already	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork”	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
assessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠaims.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠnow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠX	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠX	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠaim	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
pursue	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠme	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
additive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠimplies:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
22	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠits	 ﾠobject	 ﾠas	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠchoiceworthy	 ﾠor	 ﾠworth	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠshould	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠobject	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
characterizes	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdesiring.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwould	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelaboration	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠworked-ﾭ‐
out	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit	 ﾠup	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠJust	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ“actualize	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities”	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseparated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhow	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcontent,	 ﾠso	 ﾠtoo,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
suggest,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠmust	 ﾠactualize	 ﾠher	 ﾠpractically	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseparated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhow	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
actualization.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠ“representing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠas	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠchoiceworthy,”	 ﾠI	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
phrase	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠplaceholder	 ﾠto	 ﾠmark	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheories,	 ﾠleaving	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
open	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmet.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ
(System	 ﾠExternalityD)	 ﾠ A	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠS’s	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠS	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠthat	 ﾠS	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgrasp	 ﾠand	 ﾠregard	 ﾠas	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
choosing	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ
And	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(System	 ﾠExternalityD),	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sake	 ﾠof	 ﾠargument	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠmy	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠX	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠaim	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider,	 ﾠnow,	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
me,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠsubject,	 ﾠa	 ﾠpresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠX,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
fact	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠcope	 ﾠin	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
contrast	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠhow	 ﾠan	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠX	 ﾠdiffers	 ﾠfrom,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠexperiencing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
feeling	 ﾠof	 ﾠnausea	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdisposes	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠvomit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠof	 ﾠnausea	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
ostensible	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvomiting:	 ﾠit	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
pursue,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠas	 ﾠtending	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠunavoidable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠindication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
nausea	 ﾠand	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrelieve	 ﾠmy	 ﾠnausea	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠvomiting	 ﾠbut	 ﾠby	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
pill	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalleviates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnausea,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ–	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠsome	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠvomit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmore	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
pill.23	 ﾠ	 ﾠNot	 ﾠso	 ﾠfor	 ﾠordinary,	 ﾠchoice-ﾭ‐relevant	 ﾠdesire:	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠI	 ﾠmight	 ﾠeliminate	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠX	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠpill,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠunless	 ﾠI	 ﾠsubscribe	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠstoical	 ﾠphilosophy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrejects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
desire	 ﾠon	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠgrounds,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ
presumptive	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ
presents	 ﾠits	 ﾠobject	 ﾠas	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠto-ﾭ‐be-ﾭ‐pursued	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnausea	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
vomiting:	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak,	 ﾠas	 ﾠKorsgaard	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠasking	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠ“is	 ﾠreally	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason”	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠit	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠclear	 ﾠhow	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠpresumptive	 ﾠreasonableness	 ﾠof	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠview,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
seen,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnot	 ﾠper	 ﾠse	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠits	 ﾠseeming	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠ
X.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
23	 ﾠNothing	 ﾠturns	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠnausea	 ﾠis	 ﾠcorrect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠit	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠconceivable	 ﾠ
view	 ﾠof	 ﾠnausea,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ There	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠhypothetical	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠWarren	 ﾠQuinn,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
helps	 ﾠto	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠQuinn	 ﾠasks	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrute	 ﾠ
impulse	 ﾠto	 ﾠturn	 ﾠon	 ﾠradios	 ﾠwhenever	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsees	 ﾠthem:	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠhear	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroadcast,	 ﾠor	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠother	 ﾠpurpose,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠunaccountably	 ﾠ(perhaps	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠhypnotic	 ﾠsuggestion,	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠscientist’s	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠodd	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠamong	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbrain	 ﾠsynapses).	 ﾠ	 ﾠImagining	 ﾠ
himself	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson,	 ﾠQuinn	 ﾠremarks:	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbizarre	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠstate	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself	 ﾠgives	 ﾠme	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠprima	 ﾠ
facie	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠturn	 ﾠon	 ﾠradios…	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠexplain,	 ﾠcausally,	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠI	 ﾠturn	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠradio,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠsensible,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠin	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
resisting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattendant	 ﾠdisposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠpainful	 ﾠand	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠin	 ﾠpleasant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcase	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠprospect	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠrelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Quinn	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ237)	 ﾠ
Quinn	 ﾠconstructs	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexample	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠto	 ﾠarguing	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHumean	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrute	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠX	 ﾠby	 ﾠitself	 ﾠconstitutes	 ﾠmy	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsidered	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexample	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“impulse”	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeven	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠsense.24	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠsense	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
ordinary,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠto	 ﾠus	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠ–	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠits	 ﾠobject	 ﾠas	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠto-ﾭ‐be-ﾭ‐pursued,	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike:	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠmeriting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠendorsement	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠreason.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Reflection	 ﾠmay	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠoverrule	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠif	 ﾠour	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan,	 ﾠso	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak,	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠverdict	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreason	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠas	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠpresumptively	 ﾠvalid,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠQuinn-ﾭ‐ish	 ﾠimpulses	 ﾠto	 ﾠturn	 ﾠon	 ﾠradios.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
normally	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠits	 ﾠappearing	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX	 ﾠcould,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
represent	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway:	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdid	 ﾠitself	 ﾠnot	 ﾠengage	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠthus	 ﾠappears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ(System	 ﾠExternalityD).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠunless	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠreject	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ(Canonical	 ﾠ
ExplanationD)	 ﾠor	 ﾠ(Non-ﾭ‐disruptive	 ﾠInfluenceD),	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠphilosopher	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
24	 ﾠA	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠQuinn’s	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠat	 ﾠScanlon	 ﾠ1998,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ38.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
“intelligibility”	 ﾠof	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠStampe	 ﾠ1987.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 24	 ﾠ
finds	 ﾠ(Canonical	 ﾠExplanationD)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(Non-ﾭ‐disruptive	 ﾠInfluenceD)	 ﾠattractive,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
hand,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠway	 ﾠout	 ﾠmay	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠreject	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ An	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠmight	 ﾠreply	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠhis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠS’s	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠits	 ﾠappearing	 ﾠto	 ﾠS	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠ
X,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠcan	 ﾠstill	 ﾠallow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠextrinsic	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
presented	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason.25	 ﾠ	 ﾠMight	 ﾠthere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsome	 ﾠlinking	 ﾠdisposition,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbelonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠS’s	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠin	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubjects,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
ensures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnormally,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠS	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠX,	 ﾠit	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠS	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Well,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠdisposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“back	 ﾠup”	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠher	 ﾠdispositions	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
scrutinize	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠ–	 ﾠif,	 ﾠto	 ﾠput	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠin	 ﾠMcDowellian	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
prima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠreason-ﾭ‐assessments	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“exculpatory”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“justifying”	 ﾠway	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠdisposition	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠshe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
continued	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠher	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠsound.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
requirement	 ﾠby	 ﾠinsisting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠdisposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrationally-ﾭ‐reviewable	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject,	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
(D)	 ﾠ My	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠme	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
pursue.	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ(D),	 ﾠthen	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠher	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
seeming	 ﾠto	 ﾠher	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX,	 ﾠstill	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠintelligibly	 ﾠregard	 ﾠher	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠX	 ﾠas	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠit	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠher	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
desiring	 ﾠand	 ﾠher	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠestablished,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠintrinsically	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠextrinsically	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠ
connection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠher	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠand	 ﾠher	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠchoice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠis	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠX	 ﾠmight	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠshould,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠnote	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
sort	 ﾠof	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠseems	 ﾠintuitively	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠindebted	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠanonymous	 ﾠreader	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠa	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠactual	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠmight	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
pursue	 ﾠX	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠX	 ﾠand	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ(D).	 ﾠ	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
cases	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠalready	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠX	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠme	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX,	 ﾠI	 ﾠmight	 ﾠreinforce	 ﾠmy	 ﾠconviction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠ
X	 ﾠby	 ﾠrecalling	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠconviction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠX	 ﾠon	 ﾠmy	 ﾠrational	 ﾠattention	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmediated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠseems	 ﾠ
intuitively	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠno	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠor	 ﾠinferential	 ﾠgap	 ﾠto	 ﾠbridge	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
seeming	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX:	 ﾠnormally,	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠX	 ﾠjust	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
prospect	 ﾠof	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠX	 ﾠpresenting	 ﾠitself	 ﾠas	 ﾠchoiceworthy	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrespect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠX	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠakin	 ﾠto	 ﾠnausea:	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠimpulse	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠX	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠI	 ﾠmight	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther,	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠconviction,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
resisted,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠX	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠlight.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
already	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠour	 ﾠactual	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthat.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Secondly,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠrightly	 ﾠ
characterizes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠactual	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠactualizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpowers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Taken	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupposing	 ﾠthere	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠbears	 ﾠa	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠresemblance	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“foundationalist”	 ﾠview	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠappearances	 ﾠand	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠon	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
established	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠmy	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐question-ﾭ‐begging	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
(F)	 ﾠ Having	 ﾠa	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠappearance	 ﾠas	 ﾠof	 ﾠX’s	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠF	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠme	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠX	 ﾠis	 ﾠF.	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ(F)	 ﾠis	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐question-ﾭ‐begging	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠpresuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
perceptions	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠgive	 ﾠme	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplace	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
consider	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠfoundationalist	 ﾠproject	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsucceed,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠ
objections	 ﾠto	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠepistemology	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 26	 ﾠ
meet	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠgive	 ﾠus	 ﾠsome	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠskepticism	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint.26	 ﾠ	 ﾠLikewise,	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsuggest,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠskeptical	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ“bootstrap”	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
conviction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠon	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠif,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠour	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠX	 ﾠdid	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠitself	 ﾠalready	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠour	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠX	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠaim	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠon	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠits	 ﾠsource	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠconviction	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjects	 ﾠof	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠare	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠchoiceworthy,	 ﾠa	 ﾠconviction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠrest	 ﾠon	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
question-ﾭ‐begging	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠvolitional	 ﾠ
skepticism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠjeopardize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠintelligibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationalizing	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
desire	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠface	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifficulties,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠskeptical	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ My	 ﾠaim	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforegoing	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠdoubts	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether,	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠas	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠare	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceiving	 ﾠof	 ﾠit,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠ
reasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠchoice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠamount	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠconclusive	 ﾠrefutation:	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠevery	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠmight	 ﾠmake	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠmy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠsettle	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue	 ﾠ
once	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠraising	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠ
theories,	 ﾠone	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠareas.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHaving	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstrategy,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠ
theorists	 ﾠgo	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
choice	 ﾠare	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠinteract,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠground	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelata	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
interaction	 ﾠare	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
disruptively	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠface	 ﾠ
systematic	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠskepticism	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
theories,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠmotivation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexploring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.4	 ﾠ Let	 ﾠus	 ﾠnow	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠargument	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
26	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠof	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠand	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠBrewer	 ﾠ1999,	 ﾠch.	 ﾠ4,	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 ﾠ
been	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠis	 ﾠexemplified	 ﾠin	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ McDowell’s	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠclaiming	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠperception	 ﾠmust	 ﾠactualize	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠ
capacities,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsaw,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠepisodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠcould	 ﾠplace	 ﾠno	 ﾠconstraint,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstraint,	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdopting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshorthand	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“representations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontent”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ“representations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactualize	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠ
capacities,”	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠschematize	 ﾠhis	 ﾠargument	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ
(1)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Perception	 ﾠsupplies	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwith	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Judgment	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ“rationally	 ﾠconstrained”	 ﾠby	 ﾠperception.)	 ﾠ
(2)	 ﾠ A	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reflection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(3)	 ﾠ A	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠ
available	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠsubject.	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠ	 ﾠ (4)	 ﾠ Perception	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ us	 ﾠwith	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠrate).	 ﾠ
(1)	 ﾠformulates	 ﾠa	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(Non-ﾭ‐disruptive	 ﾠInfluence)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpremise	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
granted	 ﾠby	 ﾠmost	 ﾠwriters	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠEpistemological	 ﾠCoherentists	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠit).	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠassume	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠin	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(2),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(Canonical	 ﾠExplanation),	 ﾠarticulates	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
attractive	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠdistinguishes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠ“instinctive”	 ﾠbelief:	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
scrutinize	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcogency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠresolute	 ﾠ
“naturalist”	 ﾠabout	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠare	 ﾠreally	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠor	 ﾠmight	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeflationary	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
operations	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠattributable	 ﾠto	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠinstinctive	 ﾠbelievers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreally	 ﾠamount	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠskepticism	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational/nonrational	 ﾠcontrasts	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠa	 ﾠphilosophically-ﾭ‐
significant	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwriters	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠskeptical	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmy	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
additive	 ﾠtheorists,	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠare	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhold	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠitself	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠdistinctively	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ What	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠare	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠrejecting	 ﾠis	 ﾠ(3):	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
nonconceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
subject.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠactualizes	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ“conceptual	 ﾠcapacities”	 ﾠare	 ﾠstipulatively	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠenable	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdenial	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
representation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
perception	 ﾠmust	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceive,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠsupplies	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
perceiving	 ﾠitself	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠenable	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠgrants	 ﾠ(3),	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠa	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(System	 ﾠExternality).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠhe	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠperception	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
additive	 ﾠshape	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠmotivations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠnonconceptualism,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
plays	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠdefenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview,27	 ﾠand	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠargument	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠ(3).	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠobjection,	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
McDowell	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠstate	 ﾠitself	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
content	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstate.28	 ﾠ	 ﾠCritics	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
objection	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠon	 ﾠher	 ﾠperception	 ﾠ–	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠ
“I	 ﾠsee	 ﾠsuch-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐such,”	 ﾠ“It	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshade	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolor”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠactualize	 ﾠher	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠ
capacities,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthoughts	 ﾠare	 ﾠabout	 ﾠrepresentations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠ
content.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠspace	 ﾠto	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠsupplies	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
reasons	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreflect,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠon	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠ
granting	 ﾠ(3).	 ﾠ	 ﾠPerception	 ﾠsupplies	 ﾠme	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠusing	 ﾠconcepts,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠCompare	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 ﾠinstance	 ﾠEvans	 ﾠ1982,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ124	 ﾠand	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 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ260.	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 ﾠCompare	 ﾠPeacocke	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 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ383,	 ﾠ386-ﾭ‐7	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 ﾠ2001,	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 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠHeck	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ512-ﾭ‐9.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ
presentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠitself	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠactualize	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠmust	 ﾠresist	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠ
argument.29	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠby	 ﾠnow	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠ
familiar.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmy	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠstate	 ﾠsupplies	 ﾠme	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
nonconceptual:	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠitself	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠan	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠI	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠin	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
judgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠconceptualizing	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠis	 ﾠintrinsically	 ﾠnonconceptual.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠnow	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠact	 ﾠor	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“conceptualizing.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠthought	 ﾠconceptualizes	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
perceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠpositing	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdependence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
perception;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠdependence	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbe?	 ﾠ	 ﾠCan	 ﾠI,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠconceptualize	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
perception	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠway,	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠact	 ﾠand	 ﾠsee	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠso	 ﾠconceptualizing,	 ﾠor	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠnot?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ It	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsee	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconceptualizing	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
29	 ﾠAn	 ﾠanonymous	 ﾠreader	 ﾠhas	 ﾠraised	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreject	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
simpler	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCould	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠsupplies	 ﾠme	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
reflection	 ﾠonly	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpossession	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠon	 ﾠmy	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠitself?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠask	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠis	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmy	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
supposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠreason	 ﾠavailable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠby	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
operation	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠperceiving,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
inextricably	 ﾠa	 ﾠpresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
resulting	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠcriticize,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠidentifies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠperception	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmature	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠitself	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
rational,	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠ(§1.2),	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠmature	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠdevelops	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠengage	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠway:	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠ“intrinsically,”	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠmight	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠa	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠperception’s	 ﾠpresenting	 ﾠme	 ﾠwith	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠreflect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠvindicate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist:	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmature	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠimplying	 ﾠany	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
enable	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠreply	 ﾠto	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ
described	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ If,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠare	 ﾠactualized,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
further,	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠapprehending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠreason	 ﾠ(recognizing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reason,	 ﾠconceptualizing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠpresents,	 ﾠetc.),	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
apprehending	 ﾠ(recognizing,	 ﾠconceptualizing)	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Does	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot?	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠwill	 ﾠarise	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠthat	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠparallel	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠI	 ﾠraise	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠ
considered	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠreason	 ﾠbe?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠreason	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠstate	 ﾠitself	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
supply,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠupshot	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
conceptualizing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsee	 ﾠas	 ﾠmy	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠvery	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠother	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠreason	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpicture:	 ﾠto	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠinsert	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠwould	 ﾠinitiate	 ﾠa	 ﾠregress.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠmy	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptualizing	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsee	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reason,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcan	 ﾠI	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠupshot	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠact	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠjustifier	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠat	 ﾠall?	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠthought	 ﾠwill	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠperceiving,	 ﾠor	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠperceptually	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠme,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠwill	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠunder	 ﾠconsideration,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠjust	 ﾠin	 ﾠcase	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠstate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠcontent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
being	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstate	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmy	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠfor,	 ﾠby	 ﾠhypothesis,	 ﾠit	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
becomes	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠvia	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠthought.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThen	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmy	 ﾠreason	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
thinking	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠstate?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠmy	 ﾠthought	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠa	 ﾠground,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
cannot	 ﾠsee	 ﾠany	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclear	 ﾠhow	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠregard	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠme	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠneed	 ﾠa	 ﾠground,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠ
content	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠstate	 ﾠdrops	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠas	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠirrelevant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ
case,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠstate	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠme	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
judgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠhere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠsource:	 ﾠit	 ﾠderives	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠactualizations	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcanonically	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠderives,	 ﾠin	 ﾠshort,	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠa	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠdefender	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠnonconceptualism	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠresponded	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠis	 ﾠRichard	 ﾠHeck	 ﾠ(2000).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠHeck,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠnonconceptualism	 ﾠ
unfairly	 ﾠsaddles	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnonconceptualist	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠunreasonable	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠ
epistemology,	 ﾠone	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠperceptually-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠis	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrest	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠperceptually	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠme.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHeck	 ﾠreplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠneed	 ﾠno	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠintermediary	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠone:	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠperceptions—one	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 31	 ﾠ
allegedly	 ﾠsolved	 ﾠby	 ﾠletting	 ﾠme	 ﾠform	 ﾠthem	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠthings	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠme—why	 ﾠis	 ﾠthere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠform	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠappear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠappear	 ﾠcan	 ﾠjustifiably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠany	 ﾠintermediary,	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠcan’t	 ﾠ
judgments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠare	 ﾠjustifiably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠone	 ﾠtoo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Heck	 ﾠ
2000,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ517-ﾭ‐518)	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠattractive	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠright;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnonconceptualist,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠhis	 ﾠother	 ﾠcommitments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgranting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpremises	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
McDowell’s	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnonconceptualist	 ﾠgrants	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
advert	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠher	 ﾠperception	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠon	 ﾠher	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠin	 ﾠher	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠare	 ﾠthus-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐so.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
making	 ﾠanother	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠone	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠher	 ﾠperception	 ﾠpresents.30	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
nonconceptualist’s	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠjust	 ﾠif	 ﾠshe	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠnonconceptual	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNow,	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠherself	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠreason	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠas	 ﾠshe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠask	 ﾠthis	 ﾠabout	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmakes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠher	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠstate	 ﾠis	 ﾠnonconceptual,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠargued,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠreason	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠher.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstand	 ﾠin	 ﾠneed	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠground,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
nonconceptualist’s	 ﾠposition	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠperception	 ﾠ
implies	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
30	 ﾠThis	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠperceptually	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠher.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ(factive)	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠshe	 ﾠperceives	 ﾠthings	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠground	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
proposition	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠepistemologically	 ﾠless	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠ
proposition	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠher,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠformulate	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠfact	 ﾠabout	 ﾠher	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠis	 ﾠknown	 ﾠto	 ﾠher	 ﾠ–	 ﾠviz.,	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠ
capacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠshare	 ﾠHeck’s	 ﾠskepticism	 ﾠabout	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠepistemology	 ﾠthat	 ﾠplace	 ﾠintermediaries	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠperception	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
need	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠintermediary,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvisual	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠobject	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠproperties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠobject	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠproperties	 ﾠis	 ﾠvisually	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
know	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠless	 ﾠcontentious	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinfer	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠan	 ﾠobject	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠproperties;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
environmental	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠreason	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠit	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ
(System	 ﾠExternalityP)	 ﾠ A	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠperception	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠher	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
reasons	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠher	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ
Hence,	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠis	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠreject	 ﾠeither	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
(Canonical	 ﾠExplanation)	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(Non-ﾭ‐disruptive	 ﾠInfluence),	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
problem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠphilosopher	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(Canonical	 ﾠ
Explanation)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(Non-ﾭ‐disruptive	 ﾠInfluence)	 ﾠattractive,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠway	 ﾠout	 ﾠmay	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reject	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠrespects,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠmodest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
exactly	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠpresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
claim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠperception	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ“conceptual	 ﾠcontent”	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfigured	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠonly	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠabbreviation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠher	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
presents	 ﾠher	 ﾠwith	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠ“actualize	 ﾠher	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities,”	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠ
means	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠher	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠenable	 ﾠher	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHow	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠperception	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠhere;	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠdefending	 ﾠan	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorder	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠperception	 ﾠmust	 ﾠfollow.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreached	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmodest	 ﾠin	 ﾠanother	 ﾠrespect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠagenda	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠin	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
capacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠto	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠbears	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
connection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠa	 ﾠrich	 ﾠ
body	 ﾠof	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠscience	 ﾠof	 ﾠvision	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠpositing	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“2½-ﾭ‐D	 ﾠSketches,”	 ﾠ“3D	 ﾠModels,”	 ﾠetc.,	 ﾠis,	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassessed	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠthat	 ﾠposits	 ﾠthem:	 ﾠno	 ﾠa	 ﾠpriori	 ﾠargument	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠout	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠtheorizing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠruling	 ﾠit	 ﾠout	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠproject	 ﾠhere.31	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠus	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠones	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreflectively	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠand	 ﾠtake	 ﾠas	 ﾠour	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ It	 ﾠseems	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠas	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
31	 ﾠNor	 ﾠwas	 ﾠit	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠMcDowell’s	 ﾠproject:	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ55.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 33	 ﾠ
readiness	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠperceived	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠasked	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
proposition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠbelongs,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
perception	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjudged	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠsuccess,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
judger	 ﾠherself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠhow	 ﾠperception	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠplay	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrole	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠenable	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
transformative	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠperception.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠundeniable	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheorizing	 ﾠabout	 ﾠperception	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠabove	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
factor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠled	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
perception	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠand	 ﾠshould	 ﾠtake	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠshape.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠ
doubts	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠby	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠout	 ﾠa	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach:	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠis	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠway,	 ﾠactualizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠour	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUnity	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠ
3.1	 ﾠ The	 ﾠpreceding	 ﾠsection	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist’s	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
desiderative	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠillustrated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠfew	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheory.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAny	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
forced	 ﾠto	 ﾠposit	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠdependence,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“input”	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“output”	 ﾠ
direction,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠraising.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnames	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠare	 ﾠmanifold:	 ﾠ“monitoring,”	 ﾠ“accepting,”	 ﾠ“basing	 ﾠupon,”	 ﾠ“conceptualizing,”	 ﾠ
“intervening,”	 ﾠ“blocking,”	 ﾠ“reinforcing,”	 ﾠ“redirecting,”	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Before	 ﾠclosing,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrief	 ﾠsketch	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠ
theories,	 ﾠone	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnity	 ﾠProblem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠpresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠschematic	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠin	 ﾠpresenting	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠto	 ﾠstrengthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
difficulties	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ
theories	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠand	 ﾠdualistic	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠbody.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.2	 ﾠ Again	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠstart	 ﾠby	 ﾠrecalling	 ﾠa	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠdualism:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
objection	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠCartesians	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmind	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠsoul)	 ﾠand	 ﾠbody	 ﾠare	 ﾠ“really	 ﾠdistinct”	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠsubstances,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠright),	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
unity	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠbody	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠall	 ﾠknow	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠ
maintains	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠcannot,	 ﾠon	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠprinciples,	 ﾠcount	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠthing	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠso,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠDescartes’s	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠa	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommonsense	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠI	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠa	 ﾠmind	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbody,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbody	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠArnauld	 ﾠraised	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Descartes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Fourth	 ﾠObjections”	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeditations:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠme,	 ﾠmoreover,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠ[for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
thinking	 ﾠthing]	 ﾠproves	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmuch,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠus	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPlatonic	 ﾠview	 ﾠ
(which	 ﾠM.	 ﾠDescartes	 ﾠnonetheless	 ﾠrejects)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠcorporeal	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠessence,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠman	 ﾠis	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
vehicle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠgives	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠman	 ﾠas	 ﾠ‘a	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbody’.32	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ(reputedly)	 ﾠPlatonic	 ﾠposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠa	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠbody	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Scholastic	 ﾠphilosophy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠslogan	 ﾠ“I	 ﾠam	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbody	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsailor	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠship”	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
epitomize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposition.33	 ﾠ	 ﾠDescartes	 ﾠrepudiates	 ﾠthis	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSixth	 ﾠMeditation,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ
he	 ﾠinsists	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbody	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsailor	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠship.34	 ﾠ	 ﾠArnauld’s	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠDescartes	 ﾠis	 ﾠentitled	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠhis	 ﾠother	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠabout	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠbody.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
32	 ﾠFourth	 ﾠSet	 ﾠof	 ﾠObjections,	 ﾠin	 ﾠPhilosophical	 ﾠWritings	 ﾠof	 ﾠDescartes,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠAT	 ﾠ203,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ143.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
indebted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠilluminating	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠScholastic	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠin	 ﾠRozemond	 ﾠ1998,	 ﾠ
Chapters	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ
33	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattribution,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠAquinas,	 ﾠQuaestiones	 ﾠde	 ﾠAnima,	 ﾠq.	 ﾠ11	 ﾠ(1984,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ148).	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
attribution	 ﾠis	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“First	 ﾠAlcibiades”	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠPlato:	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠa	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbody	 ﾠis	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠmaintained	 ﾠby	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠ(129e-ﾭ‐130c;	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠcf.	 ﾠalso	 ﾠRepublic,	 ﾠ580d-ﾭ‐581c	 ﾠand	 ﾠTimaeus,	 ﾠ69e-ﾭ‐70a).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsailor-ﾭ‐in-ﾭ‐a-ﾭ‐ship	 ﾠmetaphor	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
characterize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠto	 ﾠbody	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠappear	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠPlatonic	 ﾠcorpus,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
mentioned	 ﾠby	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvicinity	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠPlato’s	 ﾠviews,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
characterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem)	 ﾠat	 ﾠDe	 ﾠAnima	 ﾠII.	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
34	 ﾠSee	 ﾠPhilosophical	 ﾠWritings	 ﾠof	 ﾠDescartes,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠAT	 ﾠ81,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ56.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 35	 ﾠ
say	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠbody	 ﾠare	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠsubstances	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠright,	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠintrinsically	 ﾠtwo,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclear	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomposite	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
supposedly	 ﾠform	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠone;	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠto	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ(since	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
thinking	 ﾠthing),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠare	 ﾠdistinct,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Descartes	 ﾠreplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠArnauld	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
[i]t	 ﾠis…	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠcall	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠincomplete	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠincomplete	 ﾠabout	 ﾠit	 ﾠqua	 ﾠsubstance,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠincomplete	 ﾠin	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠin	 ﾠconjunction	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠforms	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠunity	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠright.35	 ﾠ
That	 ﾠis,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠneither	 ﾠmind	 ﾠnor	 ﾠbody	 ﾠis	 ﾠincomplete	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠstill	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
incomplete	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠeach	 ﾠby	 ﾠnature	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠthird	 ﾠsubstance,	 ﾠa	 ﾠman,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠunity	 ﾠ
“in	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠright”	 ﾠconsisting	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠbody.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdifficulty,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
entitle	 ﾠDescartes	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠman	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠunity	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠright.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠunity	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠown	 ﾠright	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠper	 ﾠse)	 ﾠis	 ﾠstandardly	 ﾠcontrasted	 ﾠin	 ﾠScholastic	 ﾠphilosophy	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠunity	 ﾠper	 ﾠaccidens,	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠa	 ﾠunity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠtogether.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
heap	 ﾠof	 ﾠstones	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠunity	 ﾠper	 ﾠaccidens,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcomposed	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠexistences,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠexistences	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠheap.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠman	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠwhite	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠin	 ﾠanother	 ﾠway,	 ﾠa	 ﾠunity	 ﾠper	 ﾠaccidens,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠwhite	 ﾠis	 ﾠaccidental	 ﾠto	 ﾠhim	 ﾠqua	 ﾠ
man,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠman	 ﾠas	 ﾠman	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcolor	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠ
contrast,	 ﾠa	 ﾠman	 ﾠwho	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠper	 ﾠse	 ﾠunity,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠessence	 ﾠof	 ﾠman	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠbody	 ﾠform	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠper	 ﾠse	 ﾠunity,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ(according	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Aristotle	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠScholastics	 ﾠwho	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠhim)	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠexist	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
whole	 ﾠthey	 ﾠform:	 ﾠa	 ﾠhand	 ﾠsevered	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠbody	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠhand	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠname	 ﾠonly,”	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠshown	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠperform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
that,	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠenough,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdecomposes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNow,	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠman	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomposite	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠbody,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠeach	 ﾠsubstances	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠright,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠman	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠunity	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠright:	 ﾠhis	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprior	 ﾠbut	 ﾠposterior	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparts	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcompose	 ﾠhim.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠview	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠout	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠask	 ﾠ“What	 ﾠam	 ﾠI?”:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
35	 ﾠReplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠFourth	 ﾠSet	 ﾠof	 ﾠObjections,	 ﾠIbid.,	 ﾠAT	 ﾠ222,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ156.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 36	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠif	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠbody	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠform	 ﾠa	 ﾠper	 ﾠse	 ﾠunity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthinks,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
seems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanother,	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbody.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrather	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbody	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠa	 ﾠsailor	 ﾠto	 ﾠhis	 ﾠship.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠface	 ﾠan	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠanalogue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠDescartes,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
animal	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠrational	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠentities,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠis	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠright.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠexist	 ﾠindependently	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠrational	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconversely:	 ﾠrational	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
taken	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“step	 ﾠback”	 ﾠfrom,	 ﾠ“monitor”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“intervene	 ﾠin”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
operations	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠpowers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠheap	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
stones,	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠconstituents	 ﾠare	 ﾠall	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠexistences,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠa	 ﾠman	 ﾠwho	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhite:	 ﾠ
just	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhiteness	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠexist	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠinheres,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
belong	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠto	 ﾠman	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwhite,	 ﾠso	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠexist	 ﾠapart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠlife	 ﾠit	 ﾠoversees,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠqua	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
rational.36	 ﾠ	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠunity	 ﾠper	 ﾠaccidens,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
difficulties	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠthose	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠposition	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
conceives	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimality	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠas	 ﾠunited	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.3	 ﾠ As	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCartesian	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠask:	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠam	 ﾠI?	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠno	 ﾠdifficulties:	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠ
become	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠask	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“rational	 ﾠanimal”	 ﾠdecomposes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠview,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“rational	 ﾠanimal”	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠread	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“animal	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠfact	 ﾠrational”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠas	 ﾠdesignating	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠpower	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠessential	 ﾠnature	 ﾠas	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
36	 ﾠNote	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠThomistic	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠview	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠabove	 ﾠ(§1.3),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanimality	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
animals	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimality	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠis	 ﾠessential.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠwider	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimality	 ﾠbelongs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimply	 ﾠrationality,	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠThomistic	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠabstraction,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexemplified	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
actual	 ﾠcases	 ﾠonly	 ﾠby	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠspecies:	 ﾠeither	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimality	 ﾠor	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠ
animality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠpredicate,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠgenus,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
definite	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimality.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠAquinas,	 ﾠDe	 ﾠEnte	 ﾠet	 ﾠEssentia,	 ﾠII,	 ﾠesp.	 ﾠpara.	 ﾠ10.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 37	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠam	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“rational”	 ﾠreally	 ﾠdesignates	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠI	 ﾠam,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠfact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ“What	 ﾠam	 ﾠI?”	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe:	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
animal	 ﾠ(one	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠis	 ﾠrational).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ But	 ﾠanother	 ﾠline	 ﾠof	 ﾠthought	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠdirection.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsider	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
reflectively	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠto	 ﾠmyself,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠ“I	 ﾠ
wonder	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP?”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“I	 ﾠreally	 ﾠshould	 ﾠdo	 ﾠA.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠoccurrences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“I”	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
thinker	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠvery	 ﾠthoughts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠperson:	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthought	 ﾠor	 ﾠutters	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠsentence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠa	 ﾠthinker	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
understands	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠperson	 ﾠmust	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdeployment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
representation	 ﾠI	 ﾠexpresses	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐consciousness	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠunderstands	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
thinks	 ﾠa	 ﾠthought	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrepresentation,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠvery	 ﾠthought.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠif,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠreflection,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠasks	 ﾠ“What	 ﾠam	 ﾠI?”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠelse	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠhe	 ﾠask	 ﾠit?	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠhis	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe:	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠthinks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ What	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠcalling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnity	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
intuitive	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠis	 ﾠboth	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠthinks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
animal	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠperceptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesires.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthinker	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
supposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠthoughts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocus	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠall	 ﾠthese	 ﾠactivities?	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠwants	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“I”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠstands	 ﾠover	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“it”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperceives	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesires.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠconceives	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠclear	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠis	 ﾠsecured.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty,	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠreflectively	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesire.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠshe	 ﾠfeels	 ﾠan	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠX,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠshe	 ﾠ
reflectively	 ﾠweighs	 ﾠher	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠand	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ	 ﾠShe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
conclusion	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠstiltedly)	 ﾠby	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠto	 ﾠherself:	 ﾠ“I	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“I”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfigures	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthought	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠsubject:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠ
articulates	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠsupports.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
concluding	 ﾠ“I	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠX,”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠhas	 ﾠreached	 ﾠa	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
expresses	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠis	 ﾠdisposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠher	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 38	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠought	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠto	 ﾠgovern	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠhas	 ﾠshe	 ﾠ
thereby	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠis	 ﾠdisposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
predicated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠpredicated?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Well,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠview,	 ﾠher	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
capacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠ“perceptions	 ﾠare	 ﾠits	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠ[whose]	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠare	 ﾠits	 ﾠwill”	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠborrow	 ﾠa	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠof	 ﾠKorsgaard	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠearlier).37	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠby	 ﾠhypothesis,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld:	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠcould	 ﾠascribe	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠsubsystems,	 ﾠrepresentations	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsame	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠ
capacities	 ﾠare	 ﾠpresent,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠno	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
one.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠensures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpicture?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠ
conception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠsubject.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠapproach:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiderative	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠpossesses	 ﾠare	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrational	 ﾠreflection.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist,	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
contrast,	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal’s	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiderative	 ﾠ
capacities	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠindependently	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠrational	 ﾠpowers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠin	 ﾠus”	 ﾠcan	 ﾠresist	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdictates	 ﾠof	 ﾠchoice,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
37	 ﾠThe	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠan	 ﾠoversimplification.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimal’s	 ﾠperceptions	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠits	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠits	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠpursuits,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠquite	 ﾠcomplex.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
not,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat,	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠKorsgaard’s	 ﾠphrase:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimal’s	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠno	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
factors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠas	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠsolicitations	 ﾠto	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠrational	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
solicitations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 39	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ“weak	 ﾠwill”	 ﾠor	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“overpowered	 ﾠby”	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠobject	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠpursuit	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
endorse	 ﾠas	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠsubjects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠtheorist,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠno	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠ
threat	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠsubject,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
desiderative	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠcan	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcases	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgoverned	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠchoice,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthus	 ﾠactualized	 ﾠare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠa	 ﾠnature	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheorist,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠa	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠour	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiderative	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠis	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
additive	 ﾠway	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠreason	 ﾠmonitors,	 ﾠassesses,	 ﾠand	 ﾠintervenes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
operation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“forces	 ﾠalready	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠdifferentiates	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
operation	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠon	 ﾠanother,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsailor	 ﾠacts	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠship	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange	 ﾠits	 ﾠcourse?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠreply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠbody	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠany	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠfor	 ﾠDescartes	 ﾠto	 ﾠreply	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠArnauld’s	 ﾠobjection.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠunder	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresources	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbody	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠsubjectivity,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscene	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠ
harmonious	 ﾠaccord	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsubjectivities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠit	 ﾠsuffice	 ﾠto	 ﾠemphasize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
accord	 ﾠis	 ﾠharmonious	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠintelligibly	 ﾠso,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevolutionary	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlife	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion).	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠharmonious	 ﾠ
accord	 ﾠis	 ﾠplainly	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsubjectivities	 ﾠadapted	 ﾠto	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Nor	 ﾠagain	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠit	 ﾠsuffice	 ﾠto	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠones,	 ﾠmust,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠall	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠbearer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠa	 ﾠbearer,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠbearer	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠtortured	 ﾠsyntax,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠspeaking	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠboth	 ﾠbelong,	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠputative	 ﾠentity	 ﾠis	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentity	 ﾠDescartes	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠman”:	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
fundamentally	 ﾠone	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠthings	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeye	 ﾠcan	 ﾠjudge;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠregard	 ﾠit	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠ
subjectivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠboth	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠare	 ﾠpredicated,	 ﾠor	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsubjectivities	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 40	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠactualize	 ﾠher	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreference	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“I”	 ﾠin	 ﾠher	 ﾠthought	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠherself	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠoperative	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconceptions	 ﾠin	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠwarrant	 ﾠis	 ﾠlacking,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠin	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
me	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimal,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠCartesianism	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠ
difficulties	 ﾠin	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠembodied	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthing.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.4	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Are	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnity	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠ
difficulties?	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠdo	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠgive	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth?	 ﾠ	 ﾠLet	 ﾠme	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
making	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrief	 ﾠand	 ﾠspeculative	 ﾠremark	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠabout	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
perceptions	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠchoices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
additive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠthese	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
intuitively	 ﾠwrong,	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠ“exculpatory”	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ“justifying.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnity	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠ
sheds	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠlight	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
animal	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualizations	 ﾠour	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
intuitively	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharacterize.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠat	 ﾠall,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐action,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠput	 ﾠ
it:	 ﾠnot	 ﾠone	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠinfluencing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠof	 ﾠanother,	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠactualized,	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠway,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠfuller,	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠcharacterizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠthink	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
actualizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠare	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠgestures	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠa	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
need	 ﾠof	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠinvestigation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠadditive	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠsatisfactory	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterdependence	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
rationality	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimality	 ﾠis	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠbelonging,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠway,	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠunified	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠcapacity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInteraction	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnity	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠdifficulties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠ
underlies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 41	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConclusion:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠarguing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠabstract	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠreal	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire:	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
powers	 ﾠas	 ﾠinextricable	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallow	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠare	 ﾠactualized	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
been,	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠthing	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠshown	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
conducted	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠturn	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
perceiving	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠupshot	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood,	 ﾠour	 ﾠperceiving	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesiring	 ﾠmust	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠbe	 ﾠactualizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠrational	 ﾠform.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ
“rationality”	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠstep	 ﾠback	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠreflect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠcomplement	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠperception	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesire;	 ﾠit	 ﾠinforms	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcounterpart	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
right,	 ﾠour	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
transformative.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠits	 ﾠclassic,	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠversion,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠanimality	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠideas:	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsoul	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliving	 ﾠthing	 ﾠexists	 ﾠat	 ﾠall;	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecondly,	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ“rational”	 ﾠnames	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠsoul.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠis	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠimplies,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠ(§1.3),	 ﾠthat	 ﾠanimality,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠour	 ﾠgenus,	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
take	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠform	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbears	 ﾠit	 ﾠdictate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠreceives	 ﾠthis	 ﾠform	 ﾠmust	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠnature	 ﾠbe	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
right	 ﾠsort	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠslogan:	 ﾠour	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠ(our	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠanimality)	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠour	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠform	 ﾠ(rationality).38	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠputting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠupshot	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
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38	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠas	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠto	 ﾠform,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠAristotle,	 ﾠMetaphysics,	 ﾠVIII.	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 42	 ﾠ
say	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsucceeded,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠsound	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠ
Aristotelian	 ﾠthought.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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(1043a14-ﾭ‐26),	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ(1045a20-ﾭ‐25).	 ﾠ	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠAquinas,	 ﾠDe	 ﾠEnte	 ﾠet	 ﾠEssentia,	 ﾠII	 ﾠ(1949,	 ﾠesp.	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ35-ﾭ‐36).	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